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Merchant tonnage and the submarine

A statement issued by the War Cabinet at the request of the Board of Admiralty, showing for the United Kingdom and for the World, for the period August 1914 to December 1917;

1. Mercantile losses by Enemy action and Marine Risk;

2. Mercantile Shipbuilding Output;

3. Enemy Vessels Captured and brought into Service;

together with Diagrams, showing Mercantile losses and Shipbuilding Output for the United Kingdom and for the World, for the same period.

Merchant tonnage and the submarine

The War Cabinet have received a request from the Board of Admiralty that the full facts of the tonnage position should now be published. The War Cabinet, with the concurrence of the Allies, have agreed to this request, and have sanctioned the Issue of the following Memorandum prepared by the Board of Admiralty:-

Hitherto the Board of Admiralty have been averse from any publication other than that contained in the weekly return of losses, although it has frequently been pressed upon them that the whole tonnage facts should be made public. So long as such publication would encourage the enemy and would stimulate his energies in a dangerous direction, they have not been able to concur in the proposal. The figures to-day will not stimulate the enemy, and the Admiralty recognise that the policy of silence, necessary as they believe It to have been from a naval point of view, has had this serious defect-that it failed sufficiently to impress upon the people of this country the vital necessity for individual and united effort on their port to rnake good the losses caused by enemy submarines.

In the Spring of 1917 the full menace of the submarine campaign was first disclosed. Since that date we have steadily increased our knowledge and our material resources for this novel warfare.

Three statements are attached showing for the United Kingdom and for the world, for the period August 1914 to December 1917:-

1. Losses by Enemy Action and Marine Risk.

2. Mercantile Shipbuilding Output.

3. Enemy Vessels Captured and brought into Service.

Diagrams showing in graphic form the losses and shipbuilding output for the United Kingdom and for the world are also attached.

The situation should be viewed from the standpoint of the world's tonnage, as in these problems the mercantile navies of the whole world, excluding the enemy, may be regarded as one.

It will be noticed that the diagrams record facts, and that nothing has been included In the nature of an estimate. The point where the lines will intersect depends on the skill and energy of the Allied navies on the one hand, and the determination of employers and men in the shipyards and marine engineering shops on the other.

On the subject of losses, the Admiralty disclaim any desire to prophesy about so uncertain a thing as war in Its submarine phase. The results of the past year have shown the ability of our seamen to get upon terms with the submarine menace and gradually to gain the upper hand. This result has been achieved in spite of an imperfect knowledge of a new and barbarous method of warfare and of a scarcity of suitable material. Our material resources for this warfare are already improved and are being rapidly augmented, whilst science is placing at our disposal means of offence and defence of which we have been in need.

With regard to the other factor, a rapid and continuous increase in the output of merchant tonnage will inevitably follow the united efforts of all engaged in merchant shipbuilding in this country.

The recent production, however, of merchant ships in the United Kingdom, even making the most generous allowance for weather conditions, fell so far below the rate of output in the preceding quarter that, if improvement is not speedily made, the point where production balances losses will be postponed to a dangerous extent, and even when that point is reached we shall still have to make good the losses of the past.

During the critical period that confronts us we must rely to a large extent on our own shipyards and on ourselves. Our partners in the war are making every effort to increase their production of ships, but a considerable time must elapse before the desired output is secured.

To produce In the United Kingdom 1,800,000 tons in 1918, and to reach an ultimate production at the rate of 3,000,000 tons per annum, is well within the present and prospective capacity of our shipyards and marine engineering shops. But the ranks of the skilled men must be enlarged without delay by the introduction of men and women at present unskilled. The education of these newcomers, up-grading, and interchangeability of work are essential, and must be pressed on with the goodwill of employers, foremen, and men.

Further, the Board of Admiralty wish to make it perfectly clear that these results cannot be obtained unless maximum output is continuously given in every shipyard and marine engine shop by every one concerned.

It is to ensure the vigorous co-operation of all concerned that the Admiralty have recommended the publication of the facts.

The following Table Summarises the position at the end of 1917 :-